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A TALE OF TWO CITIES: REGULATING 
EQUITY DERIVATIVES IN NEW YORK  
AND LONDON 
Arthur Kimball-Stanley*
Abstract: This Comment seeks to understand the relative legal risk facing 
over-the-counter derivative contracts in London and New York by analyz-
ing the approach each city’s legal system took in deciding to regulate total 
return swaps. It argues that regulators on both sides of the Atlantic should 
devote equal attention to the implementation of financial regulation as 
the specific regulations themselves when it comes to limiting legal risk in 
the financial marketplace and maintaining a jurisdiction’s competitive-
ness. 
Introduction 
 Financial capital of the world: London and New York have com-
peted for this title for the last century.1 Despite the economic reversals 
of the last year in both cities, London and New York are still the pre-
mier centers of global finance.2 Given the intertwined language, his-
tory, politics, and legal and business traditions of both cities, the com-
petition between them creates interesting parallels. 
 Among these parallels is the legal and regulatory approach used to 
police the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market, the newest, most 
controversial and most innovative sector of the financial markets.3 
                                                                                                                      
 
* Arthur Kimball-Stanley is a Staff Member for the Boston College International & Com-
parative Law Review. 
1 See, e.g., Heather Timmons, New York Isn’t the World’s Undisputed Financial Capital, N. Y. 
Times, Oct. 27 2006 at C3; F.A. McKenzie, The World Metropolis: New York or London?, N. Y. 
Times, Aug. 3, 1919, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9E0DEF 
DE1738E13ABC4B53DFBE668382609EDE. 
2 Dan Roberts, Financial Crisis: Capitalism Is Not Dead Yet, but Anglo-Saxon Finance Is Looking 
Weak, Telegraph (London), Sept. 23, 2008 available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/ 
newsbysector/banksandfinance/3067289/ Financial-Crisis-Capitalism-is-not-dead-yet-but-Anglo-  
Saxon-finance-is-looking-weak.html; see Sewell Chan, Bloomberg to Help Lead Economic Conference 
in London, N. Y. Times, Sept. 26, 2008, http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/26/bloom- 
berg-to-help-lead-economic -conference-in-london (“[N]o two cities have more at stake in 
restoring stability than New York and London.”) 
3 OTC Derivative financial contracts have been written about extensively over the last 
two decades. See generally John T. Lynch, Credit Derivatives: Industry Initiative Supplants Need 
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Given the infancy of these products, the rules—or lack thereof—by 
which they are traded are still uncertain.4 This uncertainty creates legal 
risk for those entering into OTC derivative contracts, risks that must be 
evaluated and understood in order to assess the promise of any OTC 
derivative transaction.5 Policy makers and market commentators be-
lieve that those jurisdictions more willing to provide a stable regulatory 
environment for OTC derivative products are likely to see the amount 
of OTC transactions in their jurisdiction increase, along with the lucra-
tive externalities such transactions create.6 In the war to achieve domi-
nance in the financial services industry, some see the OTC derivatives 
market as the crucial theater.7 The industry’s perception of legal risk 
surrounding OTC derivatives is an important element in deciding the 
relative merits of the London and New York markets.8
 This Comment seeks to understand the relative legal risk facing 
OTC derivative contracts in London and New York by analyzing the 
approach each city’s legal system took in deciding to regulate total re-
turn swaps (TRS), a specific kind of OTC derivative. More specifically, 
this Comment will compare the narrative and consequences of CSX v. 
Children’s Investment Fund Management,9 a New York case examining the 
uses of TRS, with the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority’s 
(FSA) administrative decision to require the disclosure of some TRS 
positions.10 Both decisions, one judicial and one administrative, exam-
ined the same question regarding TRS during the first half of 2008.11
 Part I of this Comment will outline the history of the OTC deriva-
tives market in the context of legal risk. It will also describe the uses of 
                                                                                                                      
for Direct Regulatory Intervention—A Model for the Future of U.S. Regulation?, 55 Buffalo L. 
Rev. 1371(2008); Henry T.C. Hu, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance 
and Extensions, 156 Penn. L. Rev. 625 (2008). 
4 See Frank Partnoy, The Shifting Contours of Global Derivatives Regulation, 22 U. Pa. J. 
Int’l Econ. L. 421, 428–29 (2001). 
5 Id. 
6 McKinsey & Company, Sustaining New York’s and the US’ Global Financial 
Services Leadership 12–13 ( Jan. 22, 2007), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/ 
pdf/ny_report_final.pdf (arguing that financial jobs are created by affable regulatory envi-
ronment). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 49. 
9 562 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
10 See Financial Services Authority, Disclosure of Contracts for Difference: 
Consultation and Draft Handbook § 1.8 (2007) [hereinafter FSA Consultation Pa-
per]; Financial Services Authority, Policy Update: Disclosure of Contracts for 
Differences (2008), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp07_20_update.pdf [hereinafter FSA 
Policy Update]. 
11 See CSX, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 511; FSA Consultation Paper, supra note 10. 
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total return swaps and briefly discuss the regulatory structure under 
which these instruments are traded in both London and New York. 
Part II will discuss the history of the CSX v. Children’s decision and com-
pare it with the FSA’s administrative decision to require disclosure of 
TRS positions. Part III will discuss and analyze the consequences of the 
different approach used by the regulatory system in each market. Un-
derstanding the similarity and differences of the reasoning and process 
used to reach the conclusions of the respective decisions will provide 
better understanding of the legal risk OTC derivatives face in these re-
spective markets. 
I. Background 
 The word derivative describes a type of contract that “derives” its 
value from another referenced security or asset.12 Some derivatives are 
standardized and traded on public exchanges.13 Nevertheless, the vast 
majority of derivative contracts are traded on the OTC market, where 
parties to a trade negotiate terms of the contract to suit their individual 
needs.14
 A TRS is a particular kind of OTC contract, whereby parties to a 
trade agree to exchange cash flows based on the fluctuation in value of 
a share of corporate stock.15 As U.S. District Judge Larry A. Kaplan ex-
plained in the CSX v. Children’s opinion, in a TRS: 
[W]ith reference to 100,000 shares of stock of General Mo-
tors, the short party agrees to pay the long party an amount 
equal to the sum of (1) any dividends and cash flow, and (2) 
any increase in the market value that the long party would 
have realized had it owned 100,000 shares of General Motors. 
The long party in turn agrees to pay the short party the sum 
of (1) the amount equal to interest that would have been pay-
able had it borrowed the notational amount from the short 
party, and (2) any depreciation in the market value that it 
                                                                                                                      
12 Sean M. Flanagan, The Rise of a Trade Association: Group Interactions Within the Interna-
tional Swaps and Derivatives Association, 6 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 211, 214 (2001). 
13 Id. 
14 Garry J. Schinasi, R. Sean Craig & Burkhard Drees, Modern Banking and 
OTC Derivatives Market 9 (2000); The Bank of International Settlements estimates that 
the total notational amount of outstanding OTC contracts in 2007 was nearly $600 trillion. 
International Banking and Financial Market Developments, BIS Q. Rev., Dec. 2008, available at 
http://www.bis.org/statistics/otcder/dt1920a.pdf. 
15 Flanagan, supra note 12, at 220. 
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would have suffered had it owned 100,000 shares of General 
Motors.16
In the United Kingdom, a contract outlining the same set of transac-
tions is called a contract for differences.17
 Use of these products by the financial services industry is only 
about thirty years old.18 In fact, many types of derivative contracts or 
uses for them have been developed in the last decade.19 Consequently, 
the legal rules governing OTC derivatives are new and uncertain.20 For 
much of the last fifteen years, the OTC derivatives market has been 
characterized by its lack of regulation in both the United States and 
England.21 To the extent that regulation or potential regulation existed 
in either country, the novelty of the OTC derivatives market, coupled 
with its continuous innovation, made the development of market rules 
a risky proposition for market participants.22
 As one commentator explained, the OTC derivatives market is 
plagued by statutes that are “all over the financial map,” providing “little 
clarity or certainty to market participants.”23 What’s worse, judicial ap-
plication of common law principles or statutory interpretations to OTC 
derivative disputes often fail to describe the underlying transactions ac-
curately or consistently.24 Moreover, some market observers believe that 
the history of derivatives is little more than a history of financial services 
participants creating tools to circumvent existing regulation.25 The pos-
sibility that regulators will begin assessing OTC derivatives based on 
what they do—their function—as opposed to what they are called— 
their form—is one of the main sources of legal risk for the market.26
                                                                                                                      
16 CSX, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 520–21. 
17 See, e.g., FSA Proposes Extension of UK Major Shareholder Notification Requirements to Equity 
Contracts for Differences, Morgan Lewis Securities Industry FYI, July 8, 2008, http://www. 
morganlewis.com/pubs/SIFYI_FSAProposesExtensionofUKNotificationReq_8july2008.pdf. 
18 Flanagan, supra note 12, at 234–35. 
19 Id. 
20 See Partnoy, supra note 4, at 421–23. 
21 Schinasi, supra note 14, at 31; see also FSA Consultation Paper, supra note 10.; 
Philip M. Johnson & Thomas L. Hazen, Derivatives Regulation § 1.02[2][E] (2004). 
22 See Partnoy, supra note 4, at 421–23. 
23 Id. at 446. 
24 Id. at 449–50. 
25 See Helene Rainelli & Isabelle Hualt, Old Risk, New Market: Constructing the Over-
the-Counter Financial Market for Credit Derivatives 16 (2007), (Centre for the Study of 
Globalization & Regionalization Multilevel Governance Workshop Paper), available at 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/activitiesnews/conferences/gmorgan/papers/. 
26 See generally Thomas Lee Hazen, Disparate Regulatory Schemes for Parallel Activities: Secu-
rities Regulation, Derivatives Regulation, Gambling and Insurance, 24 Ann. Rev. Banking & Fin. 
L. 375 (2005). 
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 Consequently, legal risk is one of the chief considerations parties 
must weigh before entering into an OTC derivative transaction.27 The 
relative legal risk posed by a given jurisdiction is a pivotal factor in de-
termining where industry decides to grow the OTC derivatives mar-
ket.28 Analyzing the differences between how jurisdictions—in this case, 
London and New York—approach OTC derivative regulatory issues is 
one way to evaluate legal risk.29 Assuming that change in regulation is 
at least as likely to occur as market innovation for a given financial 
product, it is arguable that the approach used by regulators to imple-
ment new rules is as important as the regulations themselves.30 To this 
extent, abrupt changes in the law that allow market participants little 
time to adjust their practices is indicative of a market with significant 
legal risk.31 Legal changes that are clear and that give market partici-
pants ample time to adjust their practice to new rules are indicative of 
relatively low legal risk.32
II. Discussion 
 In the Spring of 2008, the legal and regulatory authorities in Lon-
don and New York were considering whether TRS could be used to 
evade securities disclosure laws and whether such a possibility merited 
requiring disclosure of TRS contract positions.33 The context in which 
these evaluations were made, however, differed significantly.34
 In London, the FSA was in the midst of consulting with derivatives 
traders and other members of the securities industry to determine how 
to deal with TRS.35 This initiative was the product of an overall move by 
                                                                                                                      
27 Norman M. Feder, Deconstructing Over-The-Counter Derivatives, 2002 Colum. Bus. L. 
Rev. 677, 721–22. 
28 See Darrell Duffie & Henry T.C. Hu, Competing for a Share of Global Derivatives Markets: 
Trends and Policy Choices for the United States 5 ( June 3, 2008) (U. of Texas Law, Law & Econ. 
Research Paper No. 145, 2008; Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford Univer-
sity Working Paper No. 50, 2008) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1140869; Charles 
A. Samuelson, The Fall of Barings: Lessons for Legal Oversight of Derivatives Transactions in the 
United States, 29 Cornell Int’l L.J. 767, 785–86 (1996). 
29 See Partnoy, supra note 4, at 421–23. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Management, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008); FSA Consultation Paper, supra note 10. 
34 See CSX, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 511; FSA Consultation Paper, supra note 10. 
35 See FSA Consultation Paper, supra note 10, at 1.1; FSA Implementation of the 
Transparency Directive: Investment Entities Listing Review 1 (2006), http://www. 
fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp06_04.pdf. 
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the FSA to harmonize existing English financial regulation with recent 
reforms in the European Union.36 The decision to look at the uses of 
TRS was made after “investors raised concerns relating to lack of disclo-
sure.”37 The FSA cited the following three concerns by market partici-
pants: (1) that lack of transparency regarding the economic interests of 
market participants allowed those participants to gain control over vot-
ing rights attached to underlying shares referenced by TRS; (2) that 
corporations are not able to know who has economic exposure to their 
shares; (3) that investors using TRS may outflank other investors using 
traditional financial products in influencing companies by voting 
shares.38 To determine the extent to which these possibilities were real, 
the FSA surveyed market participants, conducted a review of the rele-
vant academic literature and ran a cost benefit analysis of various 
methods of providing disclosure of TRS positions.39
 Meanwhile, in New York, a very different process took place.40 In 
March, U.S. railroad CSX sued two hedge funds, The Children’s In-
vestment Fund Management and 3G Capital Partners, alleging the de-
fendants violated disclosure rules by using TRS to secretly gain an up-
per hand in a proxy fight.41 The allegations made by CSX mirrored the 
precise concerns of English investors surveyed by the FSA.42 CSX as-
serted that the funds took large TRS positions referencing CSX stock.43 
The funds knew that given the methods used by TRS dealers to hedge 
risk, these TRS positions could be easily converted into controlling 
share positions.44 In essence, CSX asserted that the funds were using 
the TRS to take control of the company without triggering detection, 
since TRS did not have to be disclosed according to securities disclo-
sure rules in the United States.45 Over the next two months, the dispute 
saw the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and industry par-
ticipants weigh in on the issue.46
                                                                                                                      
36 See FSA Consultation Paper, supra note 10, at 1.1. 
37 See id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 1.14. 
40 CSX, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 520–21. Cf. Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham Borough 
Council and Ors, [1992] 2 AC (showing that England has used its court system to regulate 
derivative products in the past, which has created substantial legal risk). 
41 See CSX, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 518. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 CSX, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 549. 
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 The financial industry watched closely to see how both the admin-
istrative process in England and the litigation process in the United 
States would affect the market for OTC derivatives.47 During the spring 
of 2008, in both countries, the law decided whether a derivative prod-
uct would be judged by its name or by its use.48
A. FSA Analysis and Conclusions 
 In deciding to analyze TRS, the FSA concerned itself with “possible 
market failure” or lack of transparency.49 The FSA intended to analyze 
whether the non-disclosure of TRS positions allowed buyers of the con-
tracts to take large equity positions in order to influence corporate gov-
ernance without notifying corporate managers or other shareholders.50 
Such a possibility could, according to the FSA, potentially lead to ineffi-
cient price information, a distorted market for corporate control, di-
minished market confidence and information asymmetry for equity 
investors.51
 The FSA worried that under the current rules TRS traders could 
wind up knowing more about a company’s ownership than the rest of 
the market’s participants.52 The FSA believed this could happen either 
through banks, typical sellers of TRS contracts, voting on behalf of TRS 
holders or through the quick acquisition of a bank’s equity hedge (“it 
would be difficult to find a seller who would for example sell 5% of a 
company”).53 In either case, the TRS seller’s hedge transfers knowledge 
to the buyer regarding the location and potential voting positions of 
shares to which the market as a whole is not privy.54 Nevertheless, the 
FSA realized that “lack of full information itself is not a market fail-
ure.”55 Market failures only arise when, the FSA said, market “imperfec-
                                                                                                                      
47 See, e.g., Ron Orol, Ex-SEC Chief Urges Swap Disclosures, Deal, July 22, 2008, available at 
2008 WLNR 13638219.
48 See CSX, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 549; FSA Consultation Paper, supra note 10. 
49 FSA Consultation Paper, supra note 10, at 3.12. 
50 Id. at 3.20. 
51 Id. at 3.14–.22. 
52 Id. at 3.14. 
53 Id. To understand the FSA’s worries requires an understanding of how a TRS seller 
hedges its risk. When a buyer purchases a TRS contract it pays an upfront fee to place a bet 
on what will happen to a give company’s equity shares. The buyer will be paid any amount 
by which those equity shares increase. To hedge its bet the seller, which is usually a bank, 
will buy the shares on which the two parties to the trade have bet. CSX, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 
519–24. TRS sellers are said to exercise voting rights of the shares they acquire in ways that 
mirror the interests of the counterparty to the TRS trade. Id. 
54 FSA Consultation Paper, supra note 10, at 3.14. 
55 Id. at 3.18. 
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tions [are] large enough to suggest that regulatory intervention has a 
realistic prospect of improving market outcomes.”56
 The FSA reasoned that the potential for market imperfection was 
deemed to be especially great when it came to the market corporate 
control.57 Lack of disclosure rules, the FSA said, allowed those organiz-
ing a takeover to use TRS to gain an ownership toehold in terms of con-
trolled shares to which the market would be blind.58 The FSA worried 
that toeholds could discourage other potential bidders from contesting 
the takeover, as they would be at a “competitive disadvantage” relative to 
a bidder with a toehold.59 The FSA regarded such a disadvantage as 
enough to keep other bidders from participating in the market, which 
could lead to the inefficient pricing of corporate shares.60
 Moreover, the FSA worried that the influence TRS buyers poten-
tially have over sellers could be a deterrent for smaller players from 
participating in the market.61 “Without disclosure,” the FSA wrote, “in-
vestors may be deterred from participating in the market if they feel 
uncertain about who the players are.”62 This issue might also be prob-
lematic for the corporations themselves, according to the FSA, as it 
might lead to issuers expending resources to align their shareholder 
roles with the market’s actual make-up.63 The FSA viewed such expen-
ditures as inefficient because it essentially forced corporations to inter-
nalize transparency costs that the majority of FSA regulations assign to 
shareholders.64
 Once the FSA had identified possible market failures, it then set 
out to discover the extent to which the possibility of such failures were 
believed by market participants to occur.65 A review of academic and 
professional literature revealed that the potential market failures the 
FSA had identified were of great concern to most market observers.66 
Furthermore, regulators in other jurisdictions—Hong Kong, Australia, 
New Zealand, and Switzerland—were introducing disclosure rules for 
                                                                                                                      
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 3.19. 
58 Id. 
59 FSA Consultation Paper, supra note 10, at 3.19. 
60 Id. at 3.20. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 3.21. 
64 FSA Consultation Paper, supra note 10, at 3.21. 
65 Id. at 4.1–.35. 
66 Id. 
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TRS based on similar fears about market failures.67 The FSA also com-
missioned an independent study, which found some evidence of the 
type of market failures the FSA described, as well as a cost benefit analy-
sis of adopting different regulatory responses to TRS.68 Finally, the FSA 
consulted market participants as to what kind of TRS regulation would 
most benefit the market for equities.69 This consultation took place 
over several months, after the FSA’s research had been made public.70
 Among the most vocal groups with whom the FSA consulted was 
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), a trade 
group that represents participants in the OTC derivatives market, 
which are chiefly large banks that make markets for OTC derivatives.71 
The group lobbies on behalf of derivatives market participants and at-
tempts to create industry protocols with which derivative contracts can 
be standardized.72 The ISDA argued that there was no valid policy need 
to change FSA rules concerning TRS.73 At the same time the ISDA 
stated that it appreciated the manner in which the FSA approached 
changing the rules, stressing that industry consultation was an impor-
tant part of the process. 74
 Despite the ISDA’s advice, the FSA concluded that TRS were some-
times, but not always, used to “influence votes and other corporate gov-
ernance matters.”75 As a result, some sort of regulation of the TRS mar-
ket was necessary.76 The new rules proposed by the FSA would treat 
TRS positions like equity positions.77 They would require disclosure as 
soon as market participants acquired a three percent equity stake in a 
company, measured by aggregating TRS with company shares.78 The 
FSA decided to begin enforcing the new rules in 2009, giving market 
participants time to adjust their trading practices.79
                                                                                                                      
67 Id. 
68 See FSA Consultation Paper, supra note 10. 
69 See FSA Policy Update, supra note 10, at 3.21. 
70 Id. 
71 See About ISDA, http://www.isda.org (last visited Apr. 25, 2009). 
72 See Flanagan, supra note 11, at 229. 
73 See Letter from Richard Metcalfe, Senior Regulatory Advisor, ISDA, to Simon Cottee, 
FSA (Feb. 12, 2008), available at http://www.isda.org/c_and_a/pdf/CFDs-isda.pdf. 
74 “We are grateful,” the ISDA wrote, “for the careful and considered tone of the Con-
sultation Paper, the thorough preparation that was undertaken before it was issued and 
the clear desire it expresses to frame a sensible and proportionate regime for disclosure of 
cash-settled equity derivative transactions.” Id. 
75 FSA Policy Update, supra note 10, at 2. 
76 Id. at 2. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
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B. CSX v. Children’s Analysis and Conclusions 
 In the early spring of 2008, United States District Judge Lewis A. 
Kaplan, tasked with hearing the CSX v. Children’s case, found himself 
faced with the same market forces that led the FSA to reconsider its dis-
closure rules.80 The Children’s Fund and its fellow defendants had en-
tered into TRS contracts with banks.81 The banks had hedged their po-
sitions by buying CSX equity shares.82 Children’s Fund had, according 
to CSX, represented that it controlled or had the ability to control a 
large portion of CSX shares.83 CSX claimed that Children’s Fund in-
tended to exercise those shares to appoint directors to the CSX’s board 
if the railroad did not adhere to the hedge Fund’s proposed manage-
ment changes.84 As the proxy fight between management and the 
hedge fund commenced, CSX filed suit claiming that Children’s had 
been able to amass its large position in CSX unbeknownst to the mar-
ket by violating federal securities disclosure law.85
 “The heart of the dispute presently before the Court,” Judge Kap-
lan wrote, “concerns whether [Children’s Fund]’s investment in cash-
settled TRS referencing CSX shares conferred beneficial ownership of 
those shares upon [Children’s Fund].”86 Unlike the FSA, however, 
Judge Kaplan was not charged with designing the rules, but with inter-
preting them.87
 Initially, Judge Kaplan invited the SEC to offer its analysis of how 
SEC Rule 13d-3, the rule defining beneficial ownership of securities for 
disclosure purposes, should be interpreted regarding the use of TRS.88 
Judge Kaplan asked the SEC (1) whether Children’s fund had benefi-
cial ownership of CSX’s shares held by the counterparty banks; (2) 
what mental state is required to establish the existence of a plan or 
scheme within the meaning of 13-d3.89
                                                                                                                      
80 See CSX, 562 F. Supp 2d, 548. 
81 See id. at 518. 
82 See id. 
83 See id. 
84 See id. 
85 See id. 
86 CSX, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 539. 
87 See id. 
88 See Letter from Brian V. Breheny, Deputy Director Division of Corporate Finance, SEC, 
to Lewis A. Kaplan, U.S. District Judge ( Jun. 4, 2008), available at http://graphics8.nytimes. 
com/images/blogs/dealbook/csx_expedite_opposition.pdf. 
89 Id. 
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 In response to the first query, the SEC opined that entering into a 
TRS is not sufficient to create beneficial ownership.90 The fact that the 
TRS seller has economic incentives to act in the interest of the buyer 
does not change the analysis, the SEC said.91 Actual authority to vote or 
to direct the vote of the shares is not created by the mere presence of 
economic incentives, according to the SEC.92
 In response to the second query, the SEC wrote that a “plan or 
scheme to evade” is only manifested when the person entering the 
transaction knows that it will create a false appearance.93 The SEC rea-
soned that entering into a TRS is legitimate and even if it was done to 
avoid disclosure requirements it does not mean it was done to create a 
false appearance.94
 The SEC closed its response to Judge Kaplan by stating it believed 
any other interpretation would create “significant uncertainties for in-
vestors.”95 No further policy analysis was provided.96 The crux of the 
SEC’s argument was that if the legal rights that were being transferred 
did not fit precisely into the definitions of ownership, ownership did 
not exist.97
 Judge Kaplan disagreed with the SEC’s conclusions.98 He deter-
mined: 
[The rule] does not confine itself to “mere interpretation of 
the legal right to vote or direct the acquisition or disposition 
of securities,” but looks instead to all of the facts and circum-
stances to identify situations in which one has even the ability 
to influence voting, purchase or sale decisions of its counter-
parties by “legal, economic or other” means. 
He went on to write that focusing on Children’s Fund’s legal rights un-
der its swap contracts “exalts form over substance.”99 “The securities 
markets,” Judge Kaplan wrote, “operate in the real world and not in a 
                                                                                                                      
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 See Letter, supra note 88. 
94 See id. (“The significant consideration is not the person’s motive but rather that the 
person knew or was reckless in not knowing that the transaction would create a false ap-
pearance. In this regard, taking steps with the motive of avoiding reporting and disclosure 
generally is not a violation of 13(d) unless the steps create a false appearance.”). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 See Letter, supra note 88. 
98 CSX, 562 F. supp. 2d at 548–49. 
99 Id. 
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law school classroom. Any determination of beneficial ownership that 
failed to take account of the practical realities of that world would be 
open to the gravest abuse.”100
 For Judge Kaplan, the facts were clear. “The evidence,” he wrote, 
“that [Children’s Fund] created and used the TRSs, at least in major 
part, for the purpose of preventing the vesting of beneficial ownership 
of CSX shares in [Children’s Fund] and as part of a plan or scheme to 
evade the reporting requirements of section 13(d) is overwhelming.”101 
Children’s Fund, Judge Kaplan concluded, should not be allowed to 
use TRS to get around 13(d) reporting requirements.102
 Judge Kaplan enjoined the defendant hedge funds from using 
TRS to further circumvent securities disclosure rules.103 He did not, 
however, enjoin the funds from using the shares they had acquired 
from the banks that sold them TRS to place new directors on CSX’s 
board.104 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld this decision.105 
Judge Kaplan’s ultimate decision was to do nothing but encourage the 
Department of Justice and the SEC to take notice of his judicial find-
ings and to act accordingly.106
 The ISDA’s reaction to Kaplan’s decision was significantly less con-
ciliatory than their reaction to the FSA’s administrative decision.107 The 
ISDA claimed, in its amicus brief to The Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, that the decision created significant legal uncertainty by creating 
“a novel ‘influence’ standard for beneficial ownership that cannot be 
supported by the applicable legal precedent.”108 The result is that 
Judge Kaplan created “a potentially unmitigable risk [for market par-
ticipants] of violating (or subsequently being found to have violated) 
reporting requirements and thus incurring substantial liabilities.”109
 The ISDA made specific mention of how Judge Kaplan’s decision 
differed from the process used by the FSA in England. It argued that 
Judge Kaplan’s decision differed from the approach taken by the FSA 
                                                                                                                      
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 548–649. 
102 Id. at 572. 
103 See CSX, 562 F. supp. 2d at 572. 
104 Id. 
105 CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Management, 292 Fed. App’x 133 (2d Cir. 2008). 
106 See CSX, 562 F. Supp 2d 511 at 573–74. 
107 See Brief of International Swaps & Derivatives Association, Inc. et al., as Amici Cu-
riae Supporting Respondents, CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Management, 562 F. 
Supp. 2d 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)(No. 02–2899). 
108 Id. at 3. 
109 Id. at 27. 
2009] Regulation of Equity Derivatives in New York and London 467 
in it’s creation of legal risk and uncertainty because it did not provide 
“full opportunity for notice and comments.”110
III. Analysis 
 In terms of assessing the legal risk presented by the decisions to 
regulate TRS in both jurisdictions, the FSA’s approach is preferable.111 
Not only did the FSA provide a forum through which a legal issue 
could be evaluated by all interested parties, it also gave the market a 
clear timeline along which the decision would be carried out and clear 
guidance as to when the enforcement of the new rules would begin.112 
From the perspective of a continuously operating market, these aspects 
of the FSA rule making process make all the difference.113
 At first glance, the approaches used by the American court and the 
English regulator look similar.114 Both Judge Kaplan and the FSA real-
ized that TRS positions would have to be disclosed if the securities dis-
closure rules were to be consistent and effective.115
 The difference between the consequences of their respective deci-
sions, however, is severe. Judge Kaplan, a district judge whose decisions 
could easily be overturned, introduced a novel line of reasoning into 
American case law examining the uses of derivatives.116 The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision to affirm Judge Kaplan’s holding left 
the state of American law regarding TRS in flux, since Judge Kaplan’s 
decision did not go so far as to change the law, but merely suggest that 
the SEC and Justice Department do so.117 At the time of this writing, 
due to inaction on the part of the SEC, the regulation of TRS in the 
United States remains uncertain. 
 In contrast, the FSA decision has left the OTC derivatives market 
in England with changes to make, but no questions as to what type of 
behavior is allowed and what isn’t.118 The rules are clearly laid out in 
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the FSA’s regulatory announcements.119 The market reaction was gen-
erally welcoming, according to observers.120 Though changes will be 
made, the London OTC derivatives market knows what those changes 
will be and can adjust accordingly.121 The same cannot be said about 
New York.122
 This distinction is important for market participants attempting to 
decide where to base OTC trading operations.123 In New York, on the 
one hand, OTC derivative traders are faced with a set of legal rules that 
are unknown.124 While, at the time of this writing, it might seem as if 
New York offers a less stringent regulatory environment because TRS 
positions do not necessarily have to be disclosed, it is unclear how long 
this state of affairs will continue.125 It entirely depends on the SEC’s 
willingness to follow Judge Kaplan’s lead.126 In London, on the other 
hand, the law does require more, but it is defined and certain.127 TRS 
traders in London know what will be required of them and when.128 
Therefore, from the standpoint of market participants hoping to plan 
transactions and trading strategies, London offers a far superior regula-
tory regime in terms of legal risk.129
 Much of the difference between the outcome regarding the differ-
ent regulatory approach to TRS in England and the United States can 
be attributed to the fact that the FSA decided to evaluate their use, 
while the SEC didn’t.130 There has yet to be any significant discussion as 
to why this regulatory problem ended up in a court in one country and 
before a financial regulatory administration in another.131 Future com-
parisons of these two jurisdictions would do well to consider that ques-
tion. 
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 The beginnings of an answer might be found in the culture of the 
SEC compared to the FSA. The FSA has stated that it attempts to use a 
“light touch,” when approaching regulatory issues.132 The emphasis is 
on making the markets work, as opposed to enforcing rules and conse-
quently the regulator attempts to cooperate with industry participants 
to achieve compromise that work for all involved.133 The emphasis, ac-
cording to this description of the FSA, is on a substance over form ap-
proach and understanding how to help the market function best.134
 The SEC, on the other hand, prosecutes fraud in the securities 
markets.135 As an institution, it enforces the Securities Exchange Acts, 
and in doing so it is hoped that market efficiency will be achieved.136 
The extent to which its stance as a rule enforcer interferes with its abil-
ity to understand the purpose of the rules has been questioned by some 
observers.137
Conclusion 
 Though beyond the scope of this Comment, further research re-
garding why the FSA decided to examine the use of TRS, and why the 
SEC did not, should prove valuable. Regardless, what is clear is that the 
regulatory regime in London seems to be doing a superior job of limit-
ing the legal risk associated with OTC derivatives than its counterpart 
in New York. Such an advantage, if held for long, should help London 
outpace New York in the competition to be the financial capital of the 
world. 
 To a large extent, the events of Fall 2008 make the differing regu-
latory approaches to TRS outlined in this Comment seem minor.138 
The collapse of major financial institutions and the massive govern-
ment bailout of others are likely to bring significant regulatory changes 
in their aftermath.139 In a severe bear market, legal risk is a relatively 
minor investment factor to consider. Given the scope of the upheaval in 
the global markets, new rules and the legal risk they inherently create 
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are certain.140 Nevertheless, regulators would do well to consider why 
the manner in which the decision to regulate TRS in London and New 
York differed to such a great extent. Going forward, regulators on both 
sides of the Atlantic should regard the implementation of regulation as 
of as much importance as the specific regulations themselves. 
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